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WHAT DO MEDIA OUTLETS COMPETE FOR? 
 








  This paper studies broadcasting competition, considering not only 
television stations that maximize profits but stations that want to influence voters. 
Following two strands of the psychological literature, we argue that media exert 
influence on two different ways: (i) they can reinforce viewers in their prior 
opinions, (ii) they can modify viewers' attitudes. We consider agents who flip 
through the outlets according to pleasantness. In this context, we show that the 
aim of maximizing profits and the objective of political influence result in 
different equilibrium ideological locations. This is so since the economic aspect 
pushes television stations to locate closer and political considerations lead them to 
polarize their locations. We also show that both results do not depend on the way 
media exert influence, but they do on the fact that viewers do channel hopping. 
In particular, we observe that, due to channel hopping, the equilibrium outcome 
may not be represented by the median viewer location when stations maximize 
profits and a extreme polarization arises when outlets aim is to maximize political 
influence. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper analyzes broadcasting competition, considering not only television stations that want to
maximize proﬁts but stations that want to inﬂuence voters. In this way, we try to capture the essence of
mass media and to model what empirical evidence shows as a fact.
Television stations maximize proﬁts like any economic institution. For this reason, it is natural that
they appeal in their programs to large audiences.1 But rather than this economic context, mass media
present a great feature, and it is the possibility to expose the public to information, particularly to
political news.2 We consider it the main characteristic of the industry and the reason that explains the
aﬀairs among media outlets, interest groups and politicians. Some evidence prove these relations, like the
fact that a large number of undeveloped countries have the state as the owner of the only media outlet of
the country;3 or Silvio Berlusconi, who besides being the Prime Minister of the Italian Republic controls
the huge mass media conglomerate Finisvet; or the case of UK during the 19th Century, where most of
the newspapers were directly subsidized by political parties.4
Based on this evidence, we conjecture that interest groups are concerned with the media industry in
that media exert inﬂuence on the population. To this respect, we provide data for the British general
elections of 1992 and 1997, showing that readers tend to vote the way of the newspapers they read. This
can looks misleading, in that conservative (resp. liberal) voters tend to read conservative (resp. liberal)
newspapers and therefore vote right (resp. left). This would be the case of readers of The Times (resp.
The Guardian). But data below also sheds light on a diﬀerent dimension which concerns less political
aware voters. This is the case of readers of The Sun. McKie (1995) says to this respect: “The Sun
appeals to the uncommitted and the apolitical voters and one would expect its readers to be more open to
inﬂuence”. This is supported by the evidence we present bellow, which shows that these readers voted
right when The Sun held this ideology and left when it supported the Labour candidacy.
1Strömberg (1999) references some cases where quite popular programmes were removed because of the characteristics
of their audiences (rural or poor). Despite it, it is quite standard to identify audience with proﬁts.
2Hrebenar et al., in a study for the U.S.A. in 1996, ﬁnd that agents rank television (76%), newspapers (58%), radio
(40%), talk radio (38%), magazines (34%), talk to other people (29%) and internet (6%), as the most important information
sources about national candidates.
3Adserà et al. (2000) report that this is the case in countries like Angola, Belarus, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, China,
Ethiopia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Korea Dem. Republic, Mali, Niger, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo and Turkmenistan.
4Jean Seaton (1998).
3Table 1 shows readers’ tendency to vote according to newspapers’ preferences.
McKie (1995) also argued in the same direction, when he said: “Conservative voters are more likely
to stay loyal if they read a Conservative newspaper while uncommitted voters are more likely to choose
the Conservatives if they read a Conservative newspaper”.
The psychological literature has been concerned with this feature of mass media for long time. As far
as 1927, Lasswell stated: “Propaganda is one of the most powerful instrumentalities in the modern world”.
From then onward, this literature has been characterized by the rise of a number of strands that diﬀer
in the way they consider media exert inﬂuence. We regard two of these strands of special interest, which
we use as guidings in the exposition of the paper: the “Reinforcement Approach” and the “Attitudinal
Orientations Approach”. Brieﬂy, the idea underlying the ﬁrst strand is that media reinforce agents in
their prior opinions,5 meanwhile the idea of the second approach is that media modify the ideology of
the public.6 We use these two approaches and we give them a voting interpretation. In this way, media
will aﬀect the probability of turnout in the ﬁrst setup and will aﬀect the vote itself in the second setup.
We propose a model of competition among television stations, focusing on television news. We restrict
to this particular kind of outlets because we are going to consider viewers who observe more than one
5“The main eﬀect of media were to reinforce people in their already existing attitudes, rather than produce new ones”.
Lazarsfeld et al. (1948).
6“Among voters near the center of the political spectrum, whose political attitudes may be mixed, weakly held, or
nonexistent, even subtle biases in news coverage may have a measurable impact on electoral preferences”.S e eG u n t h e ra n d
Mughan (2000).
4station, what is more usual in television than in other media outlets, for example, newspapers.7 We
consider two television stations with diﬀerent ideological preferences: left and right. The aim of these
stations is to maximize either audience or political inﬂuence. Hence, the objective function depends both
on economic and political aspects. There is a continuum of agents of measure one, distributed according
to some continuous distribution function on the line segment [0,1], who are characterized by two variables:
ideological preference and precision.8 Agents are viewers, who decide how much time to devote to each
media, and they take this choice according to pleasantness. In this way, we allow viewers to mix between
the two television programs depending on their political preference and what the outlets report. This is
in line with the “Self selection of audience” theory, which states that people selectively expose themselves
to like-minded media content.9 In this setup, we study the kind of competition television stations are
involved in. To this aim, we consider the two aforementioned ways in which media exert inﬂuence. Thus,
we ﬁrst suppose that television can reinforce agents in their initial opinions and then analyze the case
where television can modify the ideology of the viewers. The ﬁrst important result is that competition
for audience and competition for inﬂuence leads to very diﬀerent equilibrium locations. The reason is
that the economic aspect pushes media outlets to locate closer, meanwhile the political considerations
lead them to polarize their locations. The second important result is that because of channel hopping we
are not constrained to the median viewer location as the equilibrium outcome when television stations
maximize proﬁts, but we get the extreme polarization when they maximize inﬂuence.
The literature on media is very sparse. Steiner (1952), Spence and Owen (1977) and Noam (1987)
are the ﬁrst works which consider the media industry, although they focus on the economic context.
Political studies have not been carried out until much more recent times. However, a tendency of change
seems to be taken place currently. In this literature, we ﬁnd the papers of Schulz and Weimann (1989),
Gabszewicz et al. (2001), Strömberg (2001) and Besley and Prat (2001). Schulz and Weimann (1989)
focus on the location problem of newspapers and political parties, and highlight the pattern dependence
of these choices. Gabszewicz et al. (2001) use the well-known Hotelling location model. In particular,
they consider a game in which two editorials have to decide where to locate (ideologically), which price to
charge to the newspaper, and the advertising tariﬀ.T h e yﬁnd that for several cases, newspapers’ editors
moderate their locations instead of polarizing them. Strömberg (2001) studies the inﬂuence mass media
have on political competition and on the determination of policy outcomes. He shows that because of
the increasing returns to scale of the media industry, a political bias appears hurting small groups of
voters while beneﬁting large groups. Finally, Besley and Prat (2001) use an adverse selection model to
capture the possible inﬂuencing eﬀects of a bad government on the media industry. They show that if
this inﬂuence does exist, then the role of media as an informant channel is oﬀset.
7Usually, each newspaper has its own ﬁxed readers who buy that newspaper, and not other, because of pleasantness.
However, television viewers aren’t so loyal as radio listeners or newspaper readers. In television there is more room for
chance, hazard... what turns TV into the best media source to catch confused viewers (voters).
8With precision we mean the grade of conviction an agent has in her beliefs.
9See Lazarfeld et al. (1954) or Katz (1981) for more details on this theory.
5The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model and some preliminary concepts.
Section 3 studies broadcasting competition under the assumption that television reinforce viewers in their
prior opinions. In section 4 we analyze this competition assuming that television modify the ideology of
the viewers. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Let us consider an economy with two television stations, which have a political preference.10 We
labeled L the station with a left wing ideology, and R the one with a right wing ideology.11 T h er o l eo f
media outlets is to choose where to locate, i.e. which ideology to air in their news. We denote ΠL the
location chosen by the left wing station, and ΠR the location chosen by the right wing one. Ideologies
belong to the close interval zero-one, i.e. ΠL,ΠR ∈ [0,1].W ei d e n t i f y0 with the extreme left ideology,
and 1 with extreme right. Note that we use a model of spatial competition.
We focus on the competition developed by the two stations in their televisionn e w s .T ot h i sr e s p e c t ,
we assume that the two TV news are equal in all aspects (broadcast time, duration...) but in ideology.
Television stations are ﬁrms and as such should be proﬁt maximizers. Then, as we assume audience
to be directly related to revenues, media outlets will bother audience shares. But we have assumed they
are ideology motivated, therefore they will also compete for political aims. Hence, the utility function of






for j,k = L,R and k  = j,
with h1(·) > 0,h 2(·) > 0, where the subindex (1,2) stands for the variable h(·) i sd e r i v e dw i t hr e s p e c t
to. The function Aj(Πj,Πk):[ 0 ,1]2 → R+, represents the audience of the jth channel. The function
γj(Πj,Πk):[ 0 ,1]2 → R, represents the political inﬂuence exerted by channel j.
There is a continuum of agents of measure one. These agents are characterized by two features:
ideological position, x, and ideological precision, τ. As usual, x is distributed on the interval [0,1] according
to a continuous generic distribution function F(·), with a positive density function f(·). On the other
hand, the ideological precision is a measure of the conﬁdence an agent has on her initial opinions. A way
to understand what the precision means is given by statistic techniques, where the precision is understood
to be the inverse of the variance of an agent’s ideology. Thus, if we think of the ideology of an agent as
a random variable, we can identify the mean of that distribution with the ideology of the citizen, x,a n d
its variance with the inverse of her precision.12 As a direct consequence, we say that an agent with a
10Television is supposed to expose the public to information. Hence, interest groups could be interested in the broadcasting
control because of the political advantages which derive from it. This could explain the political motivation of the stations.
11This ideological background does not imply that in same cases, if proﬁtable, television stations can adopt the other
political ideology.
12τi = 1
Va r (xi) as in Blomberg and Harrington (2000), where xi is the ideology (random variable) of the ith viewer.
6high dispersion around her mean is not really convinced of her prior opinions, meanwhile an agent with
a small variance is sure of them. In the model, we assume a ﬁxed initial value for τ, that is the same for
all agents.
Agents are viewers in that they watch television. In the model, viewers decide how to watch both
stations and they take this choice according to pleasantness. This means that we allow for agents who
choose diﬀerent time combinations to devote to each media. We formalize this idea assuming that agents
have a Cobb-Douglas utility function whose arguments are the times devoted to observe each TV news.
We deﬁne the time a viewer x watches the station j as Tj(x), with j = L,R. Thus, the utility function
of a viewer x is
ux(Tmin,T max): =( Tmin)a(x;Πmin,Πmax)(Tmax)1−a(x;Πmin,Πmax)
where min = i, max = j if Πi ≤ Πj. In this speciﬁcation, a(x;Πmin,Πmax) stands for the preference viewer
x has for the outlet that locates more to the left, therefore 1 − a(x;Πmin,Πmax) describes her preference
for the outlet more to the right. We further assume13 a(Π;Πmin,Πmax)=1
2 with Π = Πmin+Πmax
2 and
a1(x;Πmin,Πmax) < 0.
The constraint for a viewer x is that the time she spends watching television news must be equal to
one, i.e. Tmin + Tmax =1 .
Solving the maximization problem, we obtain that in equilibrium a viewer watches more than one
television station, i.e. viewers do channel hopping. This idea is empirically supported, and it enriches
considerably the model. In actual fact, we will see that the main results of this paper rely on it. Never-
theless, and to the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time an economic analysis considers the idea of
channel hopping. We solve for the equilibrium and we obtain
T∗
min = a(x;Πmin,Πmax) T∗
max =1− a(x;Πmin,Πmax).
For tractability reasons, we specify a piecewise linear function for a(x;Πmin,Πmax). This functional
form is assumed to work whenever Πmin  = Πmax. In case Πmin = Πmax, viewers are supposed to choose
any pair {Tmin,T max} such that
 







2Πx if x ≤ Π
1−x







2Πx if x ≤ Π
1−2Π+x
2(1−Π) if x ≥ Π
(2)
Note that this speciﬁcation assumes that the extreme viewers watch only one television station, which
is their closest one. We think it is a reasonable assumption since they are radical agents. Below, we
display the graphs of T∗
min,T ∗
max.
13We assume these conditions in order to be consistent with the so-called “Self selection of audience”. Lazarsfeld et al.
(1954) assert to this respect: “Most individuals expose themselves most of the time to the kind of material with which they
agree to begin with”.
7Figure 1. Time viewers watch television according to ideology.
As the “Self selection of audience” asserts, the speciﬁed structure sustains that the ideology an agent
perceives as that aired (in mean) on television is not the same for all, but depends on each agent’s
location. Thus, let m(x)=Πmin × Tmin + Πmax × Tmax be the function that represents this ideological






2Π x if x ≤ Π
Πmax − ∆Π
2(1−Π)(1 − x) if x ≥ Π
(3)
with ∆Π = Πmax − Πmin.
We represent m(x) in Figure 2
Figure 2. Mean ideology viewers observe on television as a function of x.
83 Media inﬂuence: the reinforcement approach
Persuasive mass communication functions far more frequently as an agent of reinforcement
than as an agent of change.
– Klapper, 1960
In the mass communication theory, there is a well-known premise saying that mass media can inﬂuence
viewers in four diﬀerent ways: opinion aﬃrmation, opinion deformation, opinion conformation and opinion
reformation. In this section, we pursue the opinion aﬃrmation aspect.14 Thus, we will assume that
television can reinforce the public in their prior opinions, i.e. it can make agents more conﬁdent in their
initial attitudes. This is the so-called “Reinforcement doctrine of political communication impact”.
Suppose therefore television inﬂuence is exerted through reinforcement. Then, interest groups could
be interested in media control because of two reasons.15 On the one hand , because an agent more
conﬁdent in her ideology is, ceteris paribus, an agent more willing to contributing money to the party.16
On the other hand, because an agent more sure of her ideology is, ceteris paribus, an agent with a higher
probability of turnout in the elections’ day.17 We follow the second argument, what means that interest
groups will be interested in the control of the television stations because of the possibility that the latter
inﬂuence the probability of agents going to the pools. Nevertheless, the analysis we perform is also valid
in case we decide to follow the ﬁrst argument.
To the aim of model this idea we deﬁne the ﬁnal precision of an agent at time one18 as a function
τ1(x):R+ → R+, that depends negatively on the distance between the ideology of the agent and the
ideology she observes on television. Thus, the smaller the distance, denoted as d(x,m(x)), the bigger the
ﬁnal conﬁdence of the viewer in her initial beliefs. In particular,
τ1(x): =g(d(x,m(x))) (4)






Π if x ≤ Π
(1−Πmax)(x−Π)
1−Π if x ≥ Π.
14Next section can be considered as an analysis of any of the other three possibilities.
15Petty and Priester (1994) state: “A television commercial might be based on the idea that giving people information
about a candidate’s issue position will lead to favorable attitudes toward the candidate and ultimately to contributing money
to and voting for the candidate”.
16Aldrich (1983) uses this idea of motivated agents as activists.
17Zaller (1992) says: “It is interesting to note that political interest is a strong correlate of voter turnout”.
18French (1956) deﬁnes a unit of time as the time required by an agent to accommodate her initial precision to the ﬁnal
one.
9Note that we are assuming that television stations can reinforce individuals in their prior opinions,
but cannot weaken these thoughts.19
Once we have seen how the reinforcement approach works, we can deﬁne the objective functions for
the media outlets. Recall they have two types of aims, an economic and a political one. We start with
the former. In this case, the jth television has to maximize its audience, i.e. the time the viewers of
the economy watch its TV news. Thus, as the time viewer x spends watching station j is given by the





More speciﬁcally, the audience payoﬀ functions are
AL(ΠL,ΠR)=

     
















2(1−Π) f(x)dx if ΠL > ΠR
λ1(Π) if ΠL = ΠR = Π
AR(ΠR,ΠL)=1− AL(ΠL,ΠR)
where the function λ1(Π):[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] deﬁnes the audience of the station L when ΠL = ΠR = Π. The
functional form of λ1(Π) will represent how viewers ﬂip through the stations L and R when both are at
the same location. Later, we prove that the existence of an audience equilibrium implies equal ideologies
and a particular value of λ1(·).
On the other hand, media outlets also compete for political inﬂuence. In this case, the jth television
station has to maximize the expected number of votes for the party in its way. Thus, as we have assumed
L to be the left wing station, and R to be the right wing one, the relevant interval for the former will be









19Petty and Priester (1994) say: “One of the most important determinants of motivation to think about a message is
the perceived personal relevance of that message. Most of the media messages people receive are probably not perceived as
directly relevant and they have few personal consequences”.
20Implicitly, we are assuming that there are two political parties in the economy which in equilibrium locate symmetrically
around or at one half and that viewers vote for the closest party.
10Note that in this setup the inﬂuence works on the precision. Therefore, what media outlets maximize
is the probability of their viewers going to the polls. Below, we completely specify the political inﬂuence
payoﬀ functions.
















































f(x)dx if max{ΠR,1 − ΠR} ≤ ΠL ≤ 1.

















































if max{ΠL,1 − ΠL} ≤ ΠR ≤ 1.
We now deﬁne what an audience and an inﬂuence equilibrium means.
Deﬁnition 1 An audience equilibrium is a pair of ideologies {ΠL∗,ΠR∗} ∈ [0,1]2, chosen by stations L
and R, such that
AL(ΠL∗,ΠR∗) ≥ AL(ΠL,ΠR∗) ∀ ΠL ∈ [0,1]
AR(ΠR∗,ΠL∗) ≥ AR(ΠR,ΠL∗) ∀ ΠR ∈ [0,1]
Deﬁnition 2 An inﬂuence equilibrium is a pair of ideologies {ΠL∗,ΠR∗} ∈ [0,1]2, chosen by stations L
and R,s u c ht h a t
γL(ΠL∗,ΠR∗) ≥ γL(ΠL,ΠR∗) ∀ ΠL ∈ [0,1]
γR(ΠR∗,ΠL∗) ≥ γR(ΠR,ΠL∗) ∀ ΠR ∈ [0,1]
11Let us start with the results. We present a proposition and a corollary for the case where media
outlets compete for audience, and a proposition for the case where they compete for political inﬂuence.
We observe that in the former case the equilibrium implies television stations locating at the same point,
which not necessarily coincides with the location of the median viewer. With respect to the latter setup,
we show that in equilibrium outlets choose extreme locations. Finally, we make a brief comment on how
deeply these results depend on channel hopping.
Proposition 1 Under the speciﬁed assumptions a unique audience equilibrium where television stations
air the same ideology ΠL∗ = ΠR∗ = Π∗, a n de a c ho n eo b t a i n sAL(Π∗,Π∗)=1 /2=AR(Π∗,Π∗), exists.
Proof. Let’s deﬁne as ΥL


























4(1−Π)2f (x)dx > 0.
Let’s call now ΥL
























Thus, the best response of station L against ΠR is ΠL(ΠR)=ΠR or it doesn’t exist. Using analogous
arguments we get, for the station R, that either ΠR(ΠL)=ΠL or C ΠR(ΠL). Therefore, the equilibrium
















Now, suppose there exists an equilibrium such that ΠL∗ = ΠR∗ = Π∗. If this were the case, then
AL(ΠL∗,ΠR∗)=λ1(Π∗), AR(ΠR∗,ΠL∗)=1− λ1(Π∗). At this point, note that the deﬁnition of a Nash
equilibrium implies
λ1(Π∗) ≥ max{Υ(Π∗),1 − Υ(Π∗)}
1 − λ1(Π∗) ≥ max{Υ(Π∗),1 − Υ(Π∗)}
and therefore Υ(Π∗)=1
2, λ1(Π∗)=1
2. Moreover, since Υ(Π) is a continuous increasing function with
Υ (Π) > 0, Υ(0) =
1−E[x]
2 < 1
2, and Υ(1) = 1 −
E[x]
2 > 1
2, we can assure that the equilibrium ΠL∗ =
ΠR∗ = Π∗ exists, is unique, and satisﬁes Υ(Π∗)=AL(ΠL∗,ΠR∗)=AR(ΠR∗,ΠL∗)=1
2.
It is worth mentioning here that the precise relation between Π∗ and the median viewer xm, will
depend on the asymmetry of f(x). This points to an important result: the equilibrium outcome may not
be necessarily represented by the median viewer location. To say it diﬀerently, our result breaks or sheds
ad i ﬀerent light on the well-known Median Voter Theorem (MVT), stating that it is not the median who
is important but the fact that locations and gains are the same. The next corollary presents this result,
where E[x] represents the mathematical expectation of x.
12Corollary 1 (i):I fE[x]=xm =1 /2, then Π∗ = xm. (ii):I fE[x] < 1/2 <x m, then Π∗ <x m. (iii):
If xm < 1/2 <E [x], then Π∗ >x m.
Proof. Let’s denote G(xm)=
  xm
0 xf(x)dx.T h e n w e h a v e Π∗ ≶ xm ⇐⇒ 1








2(1−xm) ⇐⇒ (1 − 2xm)G(xm) ≶ xm(1
2 − E[x]). From here, the corollary follows
immediately.
Once we know how television stations behave when competing for audience, we go on to analyze
the inﬂuence case. Next result shows that outlets competing for inﬂuence polarize their locations in
equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Under the speciﬁed assumptions an inﬂuence equilibrium exists. This equilibrium is
unique and characterized by television stations adopting polarized locations ΠL∗ =0 , ΠR∗ =1 .




4 (ΠL,ΠR) the objective functions
for the station L in case ΠL ∈ [0,min{1 − ΠR,ΠR}], ΠL ∈ [1 − ΠR,ΠR], ΠL ∈ [ΠR,1 − ΠR] and









2(x − Π)ΠLx − (x − Π)2Π
 











0 g (·)(x − Π)xf(x)dx < 0 as g (·) < 0 and Π ≥ x
the equilibrium, in case of existence, will be such that ΠL∗ ∈ [0,1−ΠR∗]. Proceeding in the same way for
station R it is easy to get the analogous result ΠR∗ ∈ [1 − ΠL∗,1]. Then, in equilibrium ΠR∗ =1− ΠL∗,
what implies symmetry about one half. Going back to ΓL
1 (ΠL,ΠR) and ΓL













∂ΠL = −4(ΠR∗)2   1/2
0 g (·)(2x − 1)xf(x)dx < 0.
Then, if ΠL∗ > 0 we would have
∂γL(ΠL∗,ΠR∗)
∂ΠL < 0, which contradicts the necessary condition for the
existence of an interior solution. Thus ΠL∗ =0 , ΠR∗ =1in the unique equilibrium.
It should be stressed that the channel hopping plays an important role in the model. To this aim,
let us now skip this assumption and suppose that viewers watch only their closest located TV news.
Under this new structure and further assuming x ∼ U[0,1] (what simpliﬁes the analysis) the ideological
equilibrium turns to be the pair ΠL∗ = 1
4,ΠR∗ = 3
4 instead of ΠL∗ =0 ,ΠR∗ =1 ;meanwhile the audience
equilibrium is now necessarily located at ΠL∗ = ΠR∗ = xm, instead of at ΠL∗ = ΠR∗, which may diﬀer
from xm. There are therefore important consequences relying on the channel hopping. With respect
to the arguments underlying these results, we can say that: (i) In the audience scenario and without
channel hopping, audience follows the same distribution as ideology, therefore the equilibrium for this
case coincides with the median of the ideology distribution. On the other hand, if we assume channel
hopping these distributions will not coincide any longer. Thus the result that the equilibrium location
21Note that g (.) stands for the derivative of g(.), evaluated following the chain rule.
13may diﬀer to that of the median viewer. (ii) In the inﬂuence setup and without channel hopping, no agent
watches more than one television news. Therefore television stations do not have to care for the ideology
aired by the other, since none of the relevant viewers of a station watch the other outlet. In this case
television stations maximize the inﬂuence locating at {1
4, 3
4}, since outlets engage in local monopolies.
On the other hand, under the assumption of channel hopping, media stations have to oﬀset the negative
inﬂuence played by the other media on the relevant public of the former outlet. Hence the polarization.
4 Media inﬂuence: the attitudinal orientations approach
Television matters insofar as it can subtly but signiﬁcantly aﬀect the attitudinal orientations of
citizens, even to the point of shifting enough votes to determinate the outcome of an election
under certain circumstances.
– Gunther and Mughan, 2000
It is widely recognized that television can also modify the public ideology itself,22 fact that hasn’t
been analyzed in the previous section. This will be our point here.
There are empirical works showing that media play a role in determining and modifying human
preferences. These works mostly consist of experiments and sample surveys.23 They both point to the
same conclusions, although they discord on the grade the inﬂuence is exerted. Lazarsfeld et al. (1954)
assert to this respect: “The controlled experiments always greatly overrate eﬀe c t s ,a sc o m p a r e dw i t ht h o s e
that really occur, because of the self-selection of audiences”. Despite it, experiments and sample surveys
agree that media exert inﬂuence. They also agree that the eﬀectiveness of the media inﬂuence on a
particular viewer depends on the distance between the ideology of the agent and the mean ideology she
observes on television, d(x,m(x)), and on the precision of the viewer, τ.24
Since we are going to allow television to modify the ideology of a viewer, we have to deﬁne a new
variable that stands for the ﬁnal ideology of an agent. Let Y (x) be this ﬁnal ideology of a viewer x.W e





xτ |x − m(x)| + m(x)
τ |x − m(x)| +1
(5)
22“In Spain it was found that a shift to the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) by undecided voters who believed
that Felipe González had won the second televised debate produced an overall net shift in the national vote of 4 percent,
which was just enough to oﬀset his rival’s initial lead in the polls and reelect the prime minister to a fourth term. Even
more convincing evidence found that because of media magnate Silvio Berlusconi used his private television networks to
advance his party’s electoral prospects, while the public Radiotelevisione Italiana (RAI) channels were much more impartial,
Berlusconi was able to beneﬁt from a net shift of over 6 percent of all votes cast”. See Gunther and Mughan (2000).
23See Hovland (1956) for a discussion on both.
24Hovland (1956) and Zaller (1992) make statements to this respect.
14with g(d(x,m(x))) = 1
|(d(x,m(x)))1/2|,a n dd(x,m(x)) = (x − m(x))2, as previously.
Note that the ﬁnal ideology of a viewer is a convex combination between her initial ideology and the
mean ideology she observes on television. Note also that




τ |x − m(x)| +1
i.e., the relative value of the change (in absolute terms) is decreasing in the initial distance, d(x,m(x)),
and in the initial precision, τ, as empirical evidence shows.25
We study two instances: (i) τ =0 , i.e. viewers have null conﬁdence on their prior opinions; (ii) τ =1 ,
i.e. viewers are ex-ante characterized by an ideological variance equal to one.26
Now, we deﬁne the audience function of a station j. Note that as audience shares are computed at
the end of the period, media outlets have to take into account that their relevant ideology distribution
is the transformed one. This means that they maximize their audiences over the distribution of Y ,n o t





with j = L,R, j  = k.   F(y;ΠL,ΠR) stands for the new distribution of the viewers27 once they have
updated their thoughts, Tj(y) for the fraction of time viewer y watches television j (according to (2)),
and RY is the range of the new variable Y .



















These payoﬀ functions are understood as the number of votes the station j gets. Note that in the
previous section the inﬂuence worked on the precision meanwhile in this section it works on the ideology.
Thus, the objective of television stations is now to maximize the mass of the public in their relevant
intervals.
25Zaller (1992) states: “During the early years of the Vietnam War, news coverage was generally slanted in the hawkish
direction. As a result, support for the war grew among less aware liberals but declined among more aware liberals. But
as news coverage became more anti-war, the same interaction occurred among conservatives; the less aware shifted in the
dovish direction, the more aware remained pro-war”.
26We think it could be of interest the study of the case where the precision is a function of the ideology, i.e. τ(x).G u n t h e r
and Mughan (2000) assert to this respect: “The Spanish study found that individuals with strongly rooted opinions on either
the left or the right are largely unfazed by the partisan bias of the media. Those near the middle of the ideological continuum
(many of whom are presumably “false centrist”, with weakly rooted or nonexistent attitudes on most issues), by contrast,
can be signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by media biases, whether these biases are exerted by television, radio, or newspapers. Since
these centrists are often the crucial swing voters in many elections, their susceptibility to media inﬂuences has considerable
political signiﬁcance”. Nevertheless and due to the complex calculus this analysis carries on, we do not analyze this case
although we comment on it later.
27The probabilistic distribution of Y, deduced from (5) and F(x).
154.1 Null precision
Suppose viewers have an initial precision equal to zero, i.e. τ =0 . As long as this means agents
with no conﬁdence on their initial thoughts, they will adopt as their ﬁnal ideology the one watched on
television
Y (x)=m(x)
i.e., viewer x update her political opinions resulting in m(x), i.e. what she has observed on television for
an speciﬁcp e r i o do ft i m e .
Note that when τ =0 , only the economic objective of the station j is well deﬁned. Thus, the audience
payoﬀ function of the outlet j is Aj(Πj,Πk)=
 
RY Tj(y)d  F(y;Πj,Πk)=
  1
0 Tj(m(x))dF(x).W eu s et h e
second speciﬁcation because of simplicity reasons. From (2), (3),a n ds i n c eTj(Π)=1
2 with j = L,R,





















f(x)dx if ΠL  = ΠR
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f(x)dx if ΠL  = ΠR
1
2 if ΠL = ΠR
Below, we present the equilibrium for the case x ∼ U[0,1].
Proposition 3 If τ =0and x ∼ U[0,1], a continuum of audience equilibria arise, i.e. every pair
{ΠL∗,ΠR∗} ∈ [0,1]2 constitutes an audience equilibrium.









Using similar reasoning we get analogous results for station R. Hence, as Ωj(Πj,Πk)=1
2 for j = L,R
with j  = k, and Aj(Πj,Πk)=1
2 if Πj = Πk, we conclude that every pair {  ΠL∗,   ΠR∗} ∈ [0,1]2 constitutes
an audience equilibrium.
The intuition of this result is that as Y (x)=m(x) and its range depends on Πmin,Πmax, whenever
a television station moves to the center it wins the viewers it approaches to, but it looses the viewers it
moves away from. This idea, together with the linearity, implies that any location gives the two stations
the same audience shares. The idea is illustrated in Figure 3, where ΠL represents the initial position of
outlet L, and   ΠL the new one.
16Figure 3. Gain and loss derived from a movement in the location of station L.
Next, we give some examples to illustrate what happens if we do not assume x ∼ U[0,1]. For these
cases we do not present generic results, but some remarks.
Case 1 Suppose x ∼ Beta[p,p] with p ≥ 2. Then, in the unique equilibrium ΠL∗ = ΠR∗ = 1
2 = xm.
Case 2 Suppose f(x)=1+b(x − 1
2) with b ∈ (0,2) i.e. the family of linear increasing density
functions. Then, in the unique equilibrium ΠL∗ = ΠR∗ =1>x m.
Case 3 Suppose f(x)=1+b(1
2 − x) with b ∈ (0,2) i.e. the family of linear decreasing density
functions. Then, in the unique equilibrium ΠL∗ = ΠR∗ =0<x m.
Note that the ﬁnal equilibrium locations are determined by the shape of the distribution functions.
Thus, the reason holding the median viewer location in the case x ∼ Beta[p,p], is that the largest mass
of the viewers has moderate political preferences. On the other hand, in a situation where most of the
individuals are conservatives, the equilibrium is the right extreme ideology. The ﬁn a lc a s ew h e r et h em a s s
of agents has liberal views is similarly analyzed. There, the equilibrium is the extreme left ideology as it
is the dominant ideology in the population.
4.2 Unitarian precision
Suppose now viewers have an initial precision equal to one, i.e. τ =1 . This is the case if viewers’
ideology is a random variable with a variance equal to one. Under this assumption, viewer x will present a
new ideology Y, once the update is done, which will be a convex combination between her initial ideology
and the ideology she watches on television. In particular
17Y (x)=

            











if x ≤ Π
x






(1 − Πmax)(x − Π)
1 − Π
+1
if x ≥ Π.
For the sake of simplicity and just in order to analyze the audience case, we assume x ∼ U[0,1], i.e.
viewers are initially distributed according to the uniform distribution function. It is important to note
that the continuum of equilibria got previously is no longer arising. The reason is that if the precision
is not zero, viewers present some grade of resistance against an ideological change. Therefore, what a
television station gains with a movement to a more moderate location is higher than what it loses. We
feel that this is a more realistic approach to the problem.
N e x t ,w es p e c i f yt h ea u d i e n c ep a y o ﬀ function of station L.28 The derivation of the distribution function
of the new variable Y , as well as its functional form are in the appendix.
AL(ΠL,ΠR)=

      
























  f (y)dy if ΠL > ΠR
λ2(Π) if ΠL = ΠR = Π
where λ2(Π):[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] is a function that deﬁnes the audience of the outlet L whenever ΠL = ΠR = Π.
Note that   f (y) is the density function of the transformed variable Y , since television stations look for
the location which will maximize their audience shares (which are measured) at the end of the period.
Working through the algebra we get Lemma 1.
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Next, we present the proposition for the audience, as well as a sketch of the proof.29
28The audience payoﬀ function of station R is easily derived using an analogous argument.
29A complete proof of Proposition 4 is available from the author on request.
18Proposition 4 If τ =1and x ∼ U[0,1], the unique audience equilibrium is   ΠL∗ =   ΠR∗ = 1
2,w h e r ee a c h
station gets one half of the audience.
Proof. Let us deﬁne ΣL
1(ΠL,ΠR) as the objective function of media outlet L in case ΠL < ΠR.














, expression which can be
shown to be positive.
Let us deﬁne ΣL












, which can be shown to be negative.
Therefore, either the best response of station L against ΠR is   ΠL(ΠR)=ΠR, or it doesn’t exist.
Using a similar reasoning we get for the station R, that either   ΠR(ΠL)=ΠL or C   ΠR(ΠL). Therefore,
the unique equilibrium in pure strategies either holds   ΠL∗ =   ΠR∗ =   Π∗ or it does not exists.
To proof that this possible equilibrium satisﬁes AL(  Π∗)=AR(  Π∗)=1 /2, we use a similar argument
to the one in Proposition 1, which give us the result that if the equilibrium exists, it must be the case
that λ2(  Π∗)=1
2 = Σ(  Π∗), with Σ(  Π∗)=1
4
 
1+2  Π∗ +
2log[1+  Π∗]




. On the other hand, the
existence and uniqueness of this equilibrium follows from the fact that Σ(  Π) is continuous and increasing
in   Π,w i t hΣ(0) < 1
2 and Σ(1) > 1
2, therefore it exists a unique value   Π∗ such that Σ(  Π∗)=1
2,w h i c h
further coincides with 1
2.
Proposition 4 states that the equilibrium locations coincide with the ideology of the new median
viewer, which can be easily proved to be also one half (since equilibrium locations are symmetric about
one half). We claim that this result comes from the fact that we have assumed x ∼ U[0,1]. We conjecture
that the result would not be the same under any asymmetric density function.
On the other hand and in order to solve the inﬂuence problem, we do not need to assume any
particular distribution function,30 since a general result is here easily obtained. We characterize it in the
next proposition.
Proposition 5 If τ =1 , the unique inﬂuence equilibrium is   ΠL∗ =0 ,   ΠR∗ =1 .
Proof. Since Y (x) is increasing in ΠL and the inﬂuence payoﬀ function is given by   F(1
2;ΠL,ΠR) for
outlet L, we have that   F(1
2;ΠL,ΠR) >   F(1
2;   ΠL,ΠR) for every   ΠL > ΠL, therefore   ΠL∗ =0 . Analogously,
since Y (x) is increasing in ΠR and 1 −   F(1
2;ΠL,ΠR) is the payoﬀ function of station R, we have that
  F(1
2;ΠL,ΠR) >   F(1
2;ΠL,   ΠR) therefore 1−F(1
2;ΠL,ΠR) < 1−   F(1
2;ΠL,   ΠR) for every   ΠR > ΠR. Thus,
it is optimal for station R to locate at   ΠR∗ =1 .
Once more, the result for the case of media outlets competing for inﬂuence shows that in equilibrium
the locations are extremely polarized.
30The unique requirement on the distribution function is, as usual, that it has positive probability in all the interval [0,1].
19We conclude with some remarks:
(i) Suppose τ is a function on x which holds the required empirical properties.31 Then we conjecture
that the ideological equilibrium would be   ΠL∗ =0 ,   ΠR∗ =1 . The reason is that if the moderate viewers are
the less resistant to a change, then television station sw o u l dh a v ee v e nm o r er e a s o n sf o rt h ep o l a r i z a t i o n ,
as they are now more interested in the centrist viewers.
(ii) Suppose τ(x) →∞∀ x. Then,32 limτ(x)→∞ Y (x)=x. Hence, the audience payoﬀ function station j
would face (in the limit) would be Aj(Πj,Πk)=
  1
0 Tj(x)dF(x), the one in Section 3. Thus, the audience
equilibrium would approach the audience equilibrium in that case. On the other hand, if τ(x) →∞∀ x,
media outlets would not be interested in the political inﬂuence as viewers in this case are totally rigid,
i.e. do not let media to inﬂuence them under any circumstance.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Mass media is supposed to expose the public to information. It is an important fact, as this exposure
allows the media to play a role in the formation of the public opinion. So much so that many interest
groups are involved in the control of media outlets.
The aim of this paper is to model the two objectives television stations usually present, as well as
to study the type of competition and the outcomes that arise in equilibrium. Thus, we have analyzed
the economic and the political aim. The reason for television stations having an economic objective is
that they are ﬁrms which should be proﬁt maximizers. The reason for these outlets having a political
objective comes from the aforementioned possibility of interest groups being concerned with the control
o ft h em e d i a .W eh a v ea n a l y z e dt h e s et w oa i m si nt w od i ﬀerent setups. The ﬁrst one refers to the case
where television play a role in modifying viewers’ voting probabilities. The second one consider the case
where television can change the viewers’ political preferences.
We derived from the model two clear results: competition for audience results in a minimal diﬀeren-
tiation, whereas competition for inﬂuence leads to a maximal diﬀerentiation. These results hold both in
the reinforcement and in the attitudinal orientation approach.
Another important outcome is that when television stations compete for the economic aim, the equi-
librium location does not necessarily coincide with the location of the median viewer. We interpret this
result as a break with MVT, although as previously pointed out, it can also be thought as a remark on
the theorem, saying that it is not the median what is important but the fact that locations and gains
are the same. Whatever the interpretation is, the point is that it is the channel hopping what gives this
new ﬂavour of the MVT. To this respect, we showed that: (i) If viewers only watch their closest televi-
sion station33 and the ideology is uniformly distributed, the ideological equilibrium for the reinforcement
31This means that extreme viewers are more rigid than the moderate ones, who are more open to inﬂuence.





33As it is in the standard models of political economy where voters vote for their closest located political party.
20setup does not imply a polarization of locations but a less important diﬀerentiation; (ii) The audience
equilibrium is directly linked with the MVT. Both results are diﬀerent if we introduce the possibility of
channel hopping. This contrast therefore highlights the role played by this assumption in the model.
The paper is somehow related to the literature on advertising. This literature usually distinguishes
between informative and persuasive advertising,34 a distinction that can also apply to the political infor-
mation mass media deliver. In this way, we consider our viewers as agents who realize these two features
of information, and therefore choose to attend to both TV news in order to oﬀset the persuasiveness
eﬀect each station introduces in its news transmission.
We also consider that one of the main contributions of this paper is the proposal of a new argument
justifying the political bias observed in real life, where by political bias we mean media outlets favoring
diﬀerent politicians and therefore giving more coverage to one party than to the other. Up to now, and to
the best of our knowledge, this bias has received little attention by economists. Besley and Prat (2001)
referred to this bias and explained it as a consequence of the viewers’ preferences for ideology. More
speciﬁcally, they argued that media outlets procure political ideologies in their news because agents like
so. We claim that this bias could be a consequence of the knowledge media have on their inﬂuencing
power. This is a new argument for the economic literature, but not at all new within the psychological
literature.
Last, let us ﬁnish justifying the title of the paper, which we consider the broader question to the
results we provide. In this way, if empirical evidence shows a minimal political diﬀerentiation between
television stations, we derive that they maximize proﬁts; whereas if the evidence points to political biases,
we infer that they compete to inﬂuence voters.
34By informative advertising is understood that kind of advertising which gives basic product information (prices, char-
acteristics), whereas persuasive advertising usually means advertising that intends to enhance consumer tastes for a certain
product, trying to boost the industry demand for that advertised product. See Oz (1995).
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236 Appendix: Derivation of the distribution function of the trans-
formed variable Y when τ=1.
F i r s to fa l l ,n o t et h a tt h ef u n c t i o nY (x) is increasing and concave for every x ≤ Π, and increasing
but convex for every x ≥ Π. We represent this result graphically.
Figure 4. Final ideology as a function of the initial ideology.
On the other hand, since x is a random variable with f(x) > 0 ∀x ∈ [0,1], and Y (x):[ 0 ,1] →
[ Πmin
Πmin+1, 1
2−Πmax] is Borel measurable (it is continuous in x), Y (x) is a continuous random variable with
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and density function,   f(y;ΠL,ΠR) or   f(y).
25